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INTRODUCTION

No one could have known the unfortunate events that would unfold on
the morning of June 25, 2012. Jeffrey Roof and Jeffrey Meyn were just ordinary
guys on the way to work when tragedy struck.' The stoplight turned yellow when
2
Roof pulled out of the dry cleaner's driveway towards the highway. While many
cars had stopped, Meyn kept going and careened into Roof s car.' Roof was later
4
declared dead at the hospital that morning.
After originally being charged with manslaughter, Meyn pleaded to the
lesser charge of negligent homicide.' As part of the plea, Meyn "stipulated to a
prison term of a year and a half and restitution that would not exceed $1
million." 6 Meyn served his time, but the battle over restitution continued.'
After nearly five years, the court finally issued a ruling that ordered
Meyn to pay one million dollars to Roofs wife.' The primary reason for the
delay in obtaining the order of restitution against Meyn was that the law did not
9
allow for a victim to present his or her case at a restitution hearing.
Roofs father-in-law, Dick Coffinger, filed a notice of appearance in
Meyn's criminal case on his daughter's behalf."o While it is not out of the
ordinary for victims in criminal cases to be represented by counsel, nevertheless,
Judge Bruce Cohen denied Coffmger's request to appear on his daughter's behalf
at the restitution hearing.'" Subsequently, Coffinger appealed the denial, and in
12
January, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. The court
reasoned that "[t]he purpose of restitution proceedings would be subverted if the
victim's counsel were allowed" because "such an arrangement would essentially
transform a criminal sentencing ... into a civil damages trial."" The court
further articulated that "a victim's personal counsel serves solely as an advocate
Michael Kiefer, A Collision, a Death anda Lawyer's Quest to ChangeArizona's Restitution
I
AM),
10:14
2017,
12,
(Jan.
AZCENTRAL.
Law,
20
17/01/12/lawyer-quest-to-changehttp://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/
36
/.
arizonas-restitution-law/964549
2

Id.

3

6

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7

Id. "Meyn was sentenced to 18 months in prison. He was [incarcerated] on March 31, 2014,

4

5

and with good time, he was released 13 months later on June 26, 2015. Meanwhile, Hyder and
Roof's father-in-law . .. battled it out over restitution." Id.
8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id.

I
12

Id.
See Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 343 P.3d 435, 438 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).

13

Id. at 437-38.
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for the victim."14 However, Coffmger continued his pursuit by taking the issue
to the Arizona Legislature.15 A bill was introduced in 2016 that added a
paragraph to the statutes on criminal restitution.1 6 The new enumerated right
included in the amendment read, "Notwithstanding any other law and without
limiting any rights and powers of the victim, the victim has the right to present
evidence or information and to make an argument to the court, personally or
through counsel, at any proceeding to determine the amount of restitution." 17
Restitution is generally viewed as compensation for a loss incurred as a
result of a crime committed.'" In criminal cases, a court orders restitution as part
of the sentencing process "to make the parties whole, to rehabilitate the defendant
and to compensate the victim for his or her financial loss.""
The boilerplate language found in plea agreements generally places a
"cap" or limitation on the amount of restitution.2 0 However, while it is
commonplace to include a cap in a plea agreement, "[c]ollecting a million
dollars" is not as equally common. 2' Unlike judgments in a civil suit, which are
subject to discharge in bankruptcy proceedings, restitution is not dischargeable. 22
While the life changing events of the above account illustrate the
function and application of restitution in the criminal context, the question
remains: where does the source of the authority to order a defendant to make
restitution originate? More specifically, does the doctrine of restitution in the
criminal context inherently flow from the court's punitive function in pursuing
justice or rehabilitative interests in criminal cases, or does it come from
somewhere else?
Courts often, to some varying degree, rely on the statutory authority in
determining whether they may order restitution.23 This Note will show that the
West Virginia restitution law has a broader scope of application than the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act24 in terms of what conduct falls within the
authority of the courts to order restitution. Then, this Note will show how West
14

Id. at 437.

5

Kiefer, supra note 1.

16

See ARIz. REv. STAT. § 8-416(E) (LexisNexis 2017).

17

Id.

18

Restitution, BLACK's

19

Kiefer, supra note 1.

20

Id.

21

Id.

LAw DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014).

Id. "Collecting a million dollars as restitution, on the other hand, is not common; it's more
like the money that might be awarded in a wrongful-death lawsuit in civil court. But wrongfuldeath awards can be sidestepped by bankruptcy. Restitution cannot." Id.
23
See infra Section I.A.2.
24
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 established procedures for determining the
amount of restitution to which a victim of a federal crime may be entitled from the defendant. See
The
Restitution
Process
for
Victims
of
Federal
Crimes,
DOJ,
https://www.justice.gov/file/414321/download (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
22
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Virginia's restitution statute experiences shortcomings because West Virginia's
law does not explicitly define "victim." Finally, this Note will argue that West
Virginia courts exceed their statutory authority when ordering restitution
pursuant to a plea agreement that includes restitution for offenses contained in
the indictment to which the defendant had not pleaded guilty. To remedy the
problems in West Virginia's restitution statute, the legislature must either enact
a new law or modify the current law so courts can exercise efficient and proper
authority when ordering restitution.
Part II of this Note examines the history and policy that led to the
enactment of federal and state restitution laws. Part II also discusses the interplay
between plea agreements as contracts and federal and state courts' authority to
order restitution as illustrated through statute and case law. Part III of this Note
analyzes the scope and application of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and
West Virginia's restitution law. It also argues that absent an explicit definition
of "victim" in West Virginia's statute, only a limited application is available: an
application that is contrary to the legislative purpose. Most alarmingly, however,
Part III also argues that West Virginia courts are exceeding their statutory
authority in ordering restitution pursuant to a plea agreement when the agreement
assigns the defendant restitution for offenses contained in the indictment to
which the defendant had not pleaded guilty.
The West Virginia Legislature must either enact a new law or modify
the current law so as to allow for courts to exercise efficient and proper authority
when ordering restitution.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II of this Note examines the history and policy that led to the
enactment of federal and state restitution laws, and also explores the interplay
between plea agreements, contract law, and federal and state courts' authority to
order restitution as illustrated through statutory and case law. Section II.A will
introduce the policy behind restitution in the criminal system and will describe
how it differs from a remedy in the civil context. It will also cover the history of
restitution and its variety in application and limitation at the state and federal
levels. Section II.B of this Note explores the use and history of plea agreements
in the criminal justice system and how a plea agreement is used in conjunction
with restitution. Next, Section II.C explores the federal restitution statutes in
depth by introducing the statute and laying out the provisions shared with West
Virginia's restitution statute. The Section then introduces federal case law
highlighting the interplay between plea agreements, contract law, and the courts'
authority to order restitution to victims of a multi-count indictment. Finally,
Section II.D examines West Virginia's restitution statute and its pertinent parts
while also exploring West Virginia case law addressing the interaction between
plea agreements, contract law, and the courts' authority to order restitution to
victims of a multi-count indictment.
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Making Amends: The Heartand History ofRestitution

This Section explores the modem-day policy and purposes behind
restitution in the criminal system. Then, it highlights the historical aspect of
criminal restitution and some of the specific provisions that states have included
within their respective restitution statutes.
1.

The Heart: The Purpose Behind Restitution

In the criminal justice system, the term "restitution" refers to
"payment[s] by an offender to the victim for the harm caused by the offender's
wrongful acts."25 The economic losses suffered by victims nationally-including
medical, property, and lost earnings-were approximately $15 billion in 2007.26
To counteract the losses sustained by victims after the fallout often created by
criminal conduct, states have adopted legislation that allows for the judicial
system to order restitution.2 7 The purpose behind restitution is to assist victims
of crimes. 28 For example, the West Virginia Legislature has stated the following:
[T]he purposes of [the restitution laws] are to enhance and
protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the
criminal justice process and to ensure that the State and local
governments do all that is possible within the limits of available
resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the defendant.29
While some states find that "the purpose of [restitution law is] to
encourage the compensation of victims by the person most responsible for the
loss incurred by the victim,"30 some other states have additionally recognized
that there are costs incurred after the commission of the crime that the victim
may acquire as a result of participating and assisting in criminal justice
hearings.31 However, the categories included in restitution statutes have become
"increasingly broad" in some states, thus allowing for restitution to move "far

Restitution, NAT'L CTR.
FOR VICTIMS
OF
CRIME
[hereinafter
NCVC],
http://victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crimevictims/restitution#civil (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
26
See Kathryn E. McCollister, Michael T. French & Hai Fang, The Cost of Crime to Society:
New Crime-Specific Estimatesfor Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG AND ALCOHOL
25

DEPENDENCE 98 (2010).
27
28

NCVC, supra note 25.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11 A-1(b) (LexisNexis 2017).

29

Id.

3

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (2017).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-1 1A-1(b) (LexisNexis 2017).

31
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beyond its traditional purpose" by becoming a "mechanism of imposing
additional punishment." 32
Still, others contend that restitution "serve[s] to appease the victim" and
deter "retaliation by the victim or victim's family" towards the offender.33 Others
still find that restitution addresses a moral obligation of the defendant to the
victim by creating a legal obligation to compensate the victim.34 Regardless of
the purpose for implementing restitution, restitution attends to multiple
functions, including both a restorative and punitive purpose.35
2. The History: Legislating Restitution, Limitations, and Use
Across the States
The principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually every
formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every
time. It holds that, whatever else the sanctioning power of
society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that
the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the
victim to his or her prior state of well-being.36
The idea of restoring and assisting the victim or disgorging the offender
of what has been illegally obtained is not a new concept.3 7 Restitution in the
criminal context has roots "as far back as biblical times[.]" 38 However, restitution
32

Cortney E. Lollar, What Is CriminalRestitution?, 100 IOWAL. REv. 93, 93 (2014).
Courts now order defendants to compensate victims for an increasingly broad
category of losses, including emotional and psychological losses and losses for
which the defendant was not found guilty. Criminal restitution therefore moves
far beyond its traditional purpose of disgorging a defendant's ill-gotten gains.
Instead, restitution has become a mechanism of imposing additional
punishment.

Id.
Woody R. Clermont, It's Never Too Late to Make Amends: Two Wrongs Don't Protecta
Victim's Right to Restitution, 35 NOVA L. REv. 363, 369 (2011).
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-601(1)(b) (2017).
34
See ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1321 (2017); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-1(b) (LexisNexis
3
2017).
36
United States v. Mueffelman, 400 F. Supp. 2d 368, 384 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing legislative
history regarding the VWPA).
33

3

38

See supra Section II.A. 1.
Clermont, supra note 33, at 369; see also Leviticus 6:1-5 (NIV).
The LORD said to Moses: If anyone sins and is unfaithful to the LORD by
deceiving a neighbor about something entrusted to them or left in their care or
about something stolen, or if they cheat their neighbor, or if they find lost
property and lie about it, or if they swear falsely about any such sin that people
may commit-when they sin in any of these ways and realize their guilt, they
must return what they have stolen or taken by extortion, or what was entrusted
to them, or the lost property they found, or whatever it was they swore falsely
about. They must make restitution in full, add a fifth of the value to it and give
it all to the owner on the day they present their guilt offering.

Id.
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became available in 1925 when Congress adopted the Federal Probation Act, 39
giving the courts the power to "place an offender on probation." 40 Subsequently,
as a result of the Act, courts could also exercise a discretionary power, which
"permitted federal courts to issue restitution orders as a condition of probation."41
Still, between 1925 and 1982, restitution remained "infrequently used as a tool,"
and its use did not increase until the late 20th century victims' rights movement.4 2
The victims' rights movement arose out of the public sentiment that the
focus of the criminal justice system was misplaced by being overly focused on
the offender while the victim generally went unnoticed.43 As a result of this
sentiment, federal legislation granted courts direct authority to order restitution
under the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA").44 However, the
legislation did not pass through unscathed: opponents challenged the
constitutionality of the statute on Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.45 However, all of these challenges were unsuccessful in
their attempts to overturn the law.46
Nevertheless, the structure of restitution changed in 1996 when Congress
enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), making restitution
mandatory in the majority of cases where the "victim suffered an identifiable
monetary loss from an enumerated crime." 47 The MVRA "partially superseded
and augmented the VWPA"48 and, consequently, federal courts were no longer
able to exercise their discretionary power to order restitution, but were instead
requiredto order restitution.4 9
Since the federal promulgation of statutory restitution, every state has
given courts the statutory authority to order restitution."o However, the variation
of restitution laws and implementation from state to state can be very wide.

42

18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed 1987).
Clermont, supra note 33, at 372-73.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 374-75.

43

Id. at 375.

4

See 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2012); Clermont, supra note 33, at 375-76.
Clermont, supra note 33, at 376-77.
Id. at 375-76.

39

40
41

45
46

See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2012); Clermont, supra note 33, at 379.
Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the
VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex PostFacto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the
Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2711, 2712 (2005).
49
See United States v. Dolan, 571 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2009). "As its name suggests,
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is all about mandating restitution. No longer is the decision
whether to order restitution for certain crimes left to the discretion of the district court." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
47
48

See Subrogation ofCriminalRestitution in All 50 States, MATrHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER,
S.C., ATTORNEYS AT LAW (July 12, 2017) [hereinafter Subrogation], https://www.mwl5o

law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/00155520.pdf.
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However, it would seem that despite the variations between states, the authority
to order restitution is statutory. Consider the following examples.
First, a defendant is convicted of theft in Georgia." The stolen property,
a rental car, was taken by the defendant from a parking lot where it had been
parked by the victim ("lessee"). 5 2 Subsequently, restitution was ordered to be
paid to the lessee in the amount of $600.11 Although the amount of restitution
had been in dispute, the lessee failed to appear at the hearing, and the prosecutor
and defendant stipulated to a restitution amount of $600.54 After being notified
of the $600 restitution amount, the lessee sought modification and, thus, filed a
motion to modify the restitution order to provide for additional restitution in the
amount of $2,623.99, which was the balance due on the amount demanded of
lessee by the lessor." A second restitution hearing was scheduled on the matter
concerning the lessee's motion, and the court granted the modification of the
restitution.5 6 The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the
modification, stating that section 17-14-12 of the Georgia Code granted the court
authority "to modify a restitution order at any time before the expiration of the
relief ordered." 7 Nevertheless, upon appealing the case to the Supreme Court of
Georgia, the restitution modification was reversed." The Supreme Court of
Georgia reasoned that criminal restitution "is inextricably linked to the punitive
aspects of the offender's sentence." 59 Therefore, the court reversed the
modification because restitution is a punishment when ordered as part of a
criminal sentence and because once the defendant has begun to serve his
sentence, courts lack the authority to modify it without the defendant's consent.60
Second, in Nevada, a defendant was involved in an altercation in which
he pulled out a gun and shot one victim in the chest. 61 A second bullet ricocheted
and struck the second victim in the leg. 62 The defendant entered a guilty plea of
two counts of battery with use of a deadly weapon. 63 The lower court ordered
that restitution be paid in the amount of $67,208.86 to the hospital, ambulance
company, and insurance company.64 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
s

Harris v. State, 410 S.E.2d 123, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).

52

Id.
Id.
Id.

53
54
6
56

Id.
Id.

5

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-12 (2017); Harris,410 S.E.2d at 124.
Harris v. State, 413 S.E.2d 439, 441 (Ga. 1992).

5

Id.

60

Id.

61
62

Martinez v. State, 974 P.2d 133, 133 (Nev. 1999).
Id.

63

Id.

6

Id. at 133-34.

5
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lower court improperly ordered him to pay restitution to an ambulance company,
a hospital, and the insurance company because they were not victims under
Nevada law, and thus the court lacked the authority to order restitution to such
entities.65
The appellate court began its analysis by stating that "authority to impose
restitution is not an inherent power of the court, but is derived from statutes."6 6
It then turned to the Nevada statute that provided "[i]f a sentence of
imprisonment is required or permitted by statute, the [sentencing] court
shall: ... [i]f restitution is appropriate, set an amount of restitution for each
victim of the offense." 67 The court proceeded to turn to the definition of a
victim." The law provided that a "[v]ictim includes: (a) A person, including a
governmental entity, against whom a crime has been committed; (b) A person
who has been injured or killed as a direct result of the commission of a crime; or
(c) A relative of a person described in paragraph (a) or (b)."69 Lastly, the court
noted that the definition of victim permitted sentencing courts to "properly order
a defendant to pay restitution to . .. county social services . .. and state welfare

agenc[ies]." 70 The court concluded that the statutory authority defining victim
includes hospital and ambulance companies as social welfare agencies but not
the insurance company.
Third, after causing a vehicle accident in Florida, a police officer was
convicted of a DUI and ordered to pay restitution.72 Before the order was entered,
however, the victim entered into a settlement agreement with the defendant's
insurance carrier that contained a stipulation that absolved the defendant of all
future liability." Thus, after the order for restitution was entered, the defendant
challenged the order based on the fact that the settlement agreement contained a
release of liability.74 Therefore, the issue before the court was "whether the

65

Id. at 134.

66

Id.

67

NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 176.033 (LexisNexis 2017).

68

Martinez, 974 P.2d at 134.

69

See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.005 (LexisNexis 2017).

7o

Martinez, 974 P.2d at 134.
Id. at 134-35.

71

The situation is different regarding an insurance company. When an insurance
company pays for a victim's medical expenses, it does so pursuant to a
contractual obligation to its insured. The insurance company is not a victim as

defined in NRS 176.015(5)(b). Further, it does not suffer an unexpected harm
or loss, as the very purpose of insurance is to cover such expenses. Therefore,
a sentencing court may not order a defendant to pay restitution to an insurance

company for the company's payment of a claim by or on behalf of a crime
victim.
Id.
7

Kirby v. State, 863 So. 2d 238, 240-41 (Fla. 2003).
Id. at 240.

74

Id.

72
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victim and defendant may foreclose the trial court's obligation to impose
restitution by entering into a settlement agreement that contains a release of
liability in a civil action prior to the disposition of the criminal case involving
the same incident." 75 The court began its analysis by turning to the Florida statute
which was the source of the trial court's authority.7 6 After noting that the trial
courts have the authority to order restitution under the statute and that the statute
requires the order of restitution, the court held that "a settlement and release of
liability on a civil claim for damages between private parties does not prohibit
the trial court from fulfilling its mandatory obligation to order restitution in the
criminal case."
The authority to order restitution has varying degrees of limitation." For
example, 18 states have included provisions within their constitutions that give
victims a constitutional right to restitution.79 Still, some states allow a court to
order criminal restitution if there is damage to persons or property as a result of
a criminal offense and if the victim specifically requests it,8 o while others extend
the recovery of restitution beyond the victim by also including dependents of the
victim." Nevertheless, while the variations of restitution law are undoubtedly
wide, there is an additional dimension created by plea bargains.
B. Making a Deal with the Devil
Many criminal prosecutions in the United States are resolved outside of
court by having both sides come to an agreement.82 This resolution is achieved
through a settlement process, like that in the civil context, called plea
bargaining. 83 Plea bargains are a common occurrence, as approximately 90% of

7
76

Id. at 241.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 (LexisNexis 2017); Kirby, 863 So. 2d at 241.

77

Kirby, 863 So. 2d at 240.
7
Subrogation, supra note 50.
7
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; CONN.
CONST. amend. 17(b); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 22; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 25;
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. I, §
37; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34; OR. Const. art. I, § 42; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23; S.C. CONST. art. I,

§

§ 35; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 30; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 9(m).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-28(c) (2017). If a person is convicted of an offense resulting in

24; TENN. CONST. art. I,

so
injury to another, the victim requests financial restitution, and the court finds that the victim has
suffered injury as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial
restitution. Id.
81
Mo. REv. STAT. § 559.021(2) (2017). "[T]he court may order such conditions as the court
believes will serve to compensate the victim, any dependent of the victim, any statutorily created
fund for costs incurred as a result of the offender's actions, or society." Id.
82
Steps in a Trial: Plea Bargaining, A.B.A.
[hereinafter Plea Bargaining],
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public-education/resources/law-related-educationnetwork/
how courts.work/pleabargaining.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
83
Id.
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the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal courts plead guilty rather
than exercise their right to stand trial before a court or jury.84
During the plea agreement process, prosecutors generally agree to
reduce the defendant's punishment to either a lower offense or a diversion
program to obtain a defendant's guilty plea."s However, "[s]ome plea bargains
[may] require defendants to do more than simply plead guilty."8 6 For example, a
plea bargain allowing for a lesser sentence may require a defendant to testify in
a particular case against another defendant." Another example includes
restitution amounts set forth in a plea agreement requiring a defendant to pay in
order to obtain a lesser charge."
Some legal experts purport that plea bargaining-unlike restitution-is
a tool that was not used with frequency until the 19th century.89 Until the latter
half of the nineteenth century, when the practice of prosecutorial plea bargaining
emerged, the common judicial practice was to discourage guilty pleas.90 "[I]n the
decades following the American Civil War, the overwhelming reaction"
regarding plea bargains was one of strong disapproval.9 1 This heightened
disapproval has led some scholars to note the possibility that the United States
Supreme Court could have invalidated the practice if given the opportunity to
review the issue.92
Despite strong disapproval, plea bargaining nevertheless became a
prevalent method of resolving criminal cases towards the end of the 19th century
and into the 20th.9 3 By the 1920s, various crime commissions had revealed that
plea bargaining was a common vehicle in the route to conviction as compared to
the preceding decades.94 As a result of this revelation, the practice was brought
to the public eye for the first time, "and once again the general reaction-of
scholars, of the press, and of the crime commissions themselves-was
84
8

Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1979).
Plea Bargain, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plea-bargain (last

visited Oct. 5, 2017).
86
Id.
87

Id.

88
UnderstandingRestitution, U.S. Arr'Ys OFF. N. DisT. GA., https://www.justice.gov/usaondga/victim-witness-assistance/understanding-restitution (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
89
Alschuler, supra note 84, at 5.
90
Id.
91
92

Id. at 6.
Id.
Indeed, although the propriety of plea bargaining did not come before the
United States Supreme Court during this formative period, there are
indications that the Court would have invalidated the practice had the issue
been presented-a development that might (or might not) have brought the
brief history of plea bargaining to a speedy conclusion.

Id.
9

Id.

94

Id.
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disapproval."9 5 It still seemed possible, as late as 1958, that the Supreme Court
might hold the practice unconstitutional, and as such, the Department of Justice
96
had taken "dubious steps" to help the issue evade the Court's reach. However,
97
in 1970, the Supreme Court decided Brady v. United States and concluded that
plea bargaining remained "inherent in the criminal law and its administration."98
Generally, the process of plea bargaining is a private one, but it has since
changed as a result of victims' rights groups pressing for laws that allow for a
99
victim to provide "input" during the plea bargaining process. The policy behind
supporting plea bargaining in the criminal justice system is "prevalent for
practical reasons." 10 For example, "[d]efendants can avoid the time and cost of
defending themselves at trial, the risk of harsher punishment, and the publicity a
trial could involve."' Additionally, plea bargains can save the courts the burden
of conducting a trial and spare the prosecution and defense the uncertainty of a
trial. 102
C. FederalEnactment andLimitations on Restitution
This Section explores the statutory force of federal restitution and
precedent regarding federal restitution. First, Section II.C.1 will explore the
federal restitution statutes in depth by introducing the particular statute and
comparing provisions with West Virginia's restitution statute. Next, Section
II.C.2 will analyze the federal case law concerning restitution and the interplay
between plea agreements, contract law, and the courts' authority to order
restitution to victims of a multi-count indictment.
1.

Restitution on the Federal Level

Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense
described in subsection (c), the court shall order . .. that the defendant make
restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's
estate." 03 The section goes on to explain:
For the purposes of this section, the term "victim" means a
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

397 U.S. 742 (1970).

98

Alschuler, supra note 84, at 6.

99

Plea Bargaining, supra note 82.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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"

commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered
including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element
a scheme, conspiracy, orpattern ofcriminal activity, any person
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
Furthermore, the MVRA has a limited scope in that only certain crimes,
like crimes of violence and offenses against property, fall within the statutory
scheme allowing for restitution to be ordered.105
Both the federal statute and the West Virginia statute state that restitution
"shall" be ordered, rendering restitution mandatory rather than permissive.10 6
However, unlike West Virginia's restitution statute,1 0 7 the MYRA has a limited
scope and explicitly allows for courts to order restitution to "persons other than
the victim of the offense" where the parties agree in a plea agreement.os The
provisions of the MVRA are further illustrated in federal case law addressing
issues of restitution. 109
2. Federal Jurisprudence of Restitution
The following illustrations demonstrate who is considered a victim for
purposes of restitution within the scope of the MYRA. Additionally, these cases
illustrate that the authority to order restitution is statutory.
In United States v. Freeman,10 the court grappled with the issue of
whether the purported victim must be a victim of the offense of conviction under
the federal restitution laws.'" The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of
obstructing an official proceeding. 1 12 The plea agreement stated that "[t]his court
may . . . order [the defendant] to make restitution pursuant to [the federal

statute]," but the plea agreement did not reveal any agreement between the
defendant and the government with regards to restitution. 1 13 The facts leading up
to the indictment and plea are interesting: the defendant was a minister between
1991 and 2003, and during this time, he formed and incorporated three

Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A). While there are other statutes under which courts are granted the
authority to order restitution, those statutes go beyond the scope of this Note.
106
See infra Section II.D.1.
10"

105

107

Id.

108
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3) (2012). "The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties in
a
plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense." Id.
109
See infra Section II.C.2.

110

741 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2014).

"'

See id at 428.

112

Id.
Id.

113
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churches.114 The defendant served as the pastor and leader of all three entities
and ultimately began to accumulate a substantial number of assets, "including a
$1.75 million residence and luxury automobiles in the names of members of the
church."' 15 Although many of the assets were in the names of church members,
16
the defendant maintained the payments.' Eventually, the defendant fell on hard
times and was forced to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and in his filing, the
defendant reported several falsities to cover the true value of his assets."' After
entering into the plea agreement, several of the church members sought
restitution for the houses and cars in their names and the damage sustained to
their credit. 11s The trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $631,050.52 1to
20
cover the damages alleged by the victims."' The defendant appealed the order.
The court ultimately concluded that the harm suffered by the victims was
12 1
not caused by the offense of conviction for which the defendant was convicted.
It reasoned that the "offense of conviction" was a single count of obstructing a
court proceeding. 122 As such, the court noted that the harm of obstructing the
court proceeding was not the type of offense that would lead to the harm suffered
23
by the purported victims.1

The foundation for Freeman was likely set by the Ninth Circuit case
Karrell v. United States.12 4 In Karrell, the defendant was convicted for
"knowingly causing to be made false certificates and papers concerning claims
12 5
for veterans' home loan guaranty benefits." As a result of the conviction, the
26
defendant was ordered to pay restitution to several affected veterans.1 Still, the
issue of restitution surfaced on appeal because the defendant was charged in the
indictment with 17 counts, each associated with a different veteran. 127 However,
the defendant was acquitted on two counts, he was found guilty of six, and nine
12 8
were dismissed.

11s

Id.
Id.

116

Id. at 428-29.

117

Id. at 429.

118

Id. at 430.

119

Id. at 431.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 439.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 438.
181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1950).
Id. at 981.

114

122
123
124
125

Id. at 983.
127
Id. at 986.
128
Id. "It will be recalled that appellant was charged upon an indictment containing seventeen
counts, each of which concerned a different veteran and that appellant was acquitted by the trial
126
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On appeal, the court concluded that the trial court erred in ordering
restitution to any veteran other than the ones directly concerned in the six counts
upon which the defendant stood convicted because restitution ordered is limited
to "actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was
had."' 2 9 After noting that the indictment contained 17 counts, each concerning a
different victim, and that the defendant was only convicted of six of those counts,
the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court erred in ordering restitution to victims
not connected with the six counts on which the defendant was convicted.13 0
In a later Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Snider,13 1 the court
concluded that restitution at the federal level is only permissible when statutory
authority permits, and since the defendant did not fall within the scope of the
available restitution statutes because the crime of conviction was not one of the
enumerated, the lower court erred in ordering restitution. 32 In Snider, the
defendant pleaded guilty to "structuring [a] financial transaction to evade federal
reporting requirements" and was "ordered to pay $183,250 in restitution." 1 33
However, the conviction arose out of a single transaction in which the victim
suffered a loss of $18,750. 134 The defendant had signed a plea agreement stating
that "[the defendant] acknowledges that the Court may direct him to pay
restitution up to the amounts listed in the column captioned 'Fee (15%)' in the
Stipulated Factual Basis for Plea."' 35 The amount in the "Fee Column" totaled
$183,250.136 After noting that "[flederal courts have no inherent power to order
restitution" and that the available statutes do not apply to the defendant because
the crime of conviction is not one of the enumerated crimes in the restitution
statute, the court reversed the restitution order.1 3 7
Overall, these cases illustrate the dichotomy between who is and is not
considered a victim within the scope of the MVRA. These cases further show
that federal courts are limited in ordering restitution because the power to order
restitution is statutorily based.

judge's order on two counts, judgments of guilty were entered against her on six counts, and nine
counts were dismissed." Id.
129
Id. at 986-87.
130 Id. at 987.
131
957 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1992).
132
Id. at 706.
133

Id. at 705.

134

Id.

I35

Id.
Id.
'3
Id. at 706. Although the applicable statute in the case was the VWPA, the VWPA had
limitations concerning the scope of enumerated crimes similar to the MVRA.
136
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D. West Virginia'sLaw on Restitution
Section II.D.1 explores the West Virginia restitution statute in depth.
Section II.D.2 introduces West Virginia case law concerning restitution and the
interplay between plea agreements, contract law, and the authority of the courts
to order restitution to victims of a multi-count indictment. Lastly, Section II.D.3
examines a line of West Virginia case law on the use of contract principles
governing plea agreements.
1.

Statutory Restitution in West Virginia

After setting forth the Legislative Findings and Purpose, the provision
allowing for victim testimony at the sentencing hearing, and provisions of the
crime victims' compensation funds, West Virginia's Victim Protection Act
makes its first operative thrust concerning restitution in section 61-11 A-4 of the
West Virginia Code. 138 Section 61-11A-4(a) states:
The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor causing physical, psychological or economic
injury or loss to a victim, shall order, in addition to or in lieu of
any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of the offense, unless the court finds
restitution to be wholly or partially impractical as set forth in
this article.139
Furthermore, under section 61-11 A-4(b), the order of restitution shall
require that the defendant-in cases resulting in damage or loss of propertyeither return the propertyl 4 0 or "pay an amount equal to the greater of' the value
of the property where it is "impractical or inadequate" to return. 141
Additionally, section 61-11A-5(a) enumerates several factors that a
142
consider when determining whether to order restitution. Section
should
court
61-11A-5(a) states:
The court, in determining whether to order restitution under this
article, and in determining the amount of such restitution, shall
consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a
result ofthe offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the

138

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-4 (LexisNexis 2017).

139

Id. § 61-l1 A-4(a) (emphasis added).

14

Id. § 61-11A-4(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 61-11A-4(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 61-11A-5(a).

141
142

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss1/10

16

Maidona: Ordering Criminal Restitution: An Exercise In Overstepping Statut

OrderingCriminalRestitution

2017]

269

defendant's dependents, and such factors as the court deems
appropriate. 143
Both sections revolve around the element of the "offense" for which the
defendant is "convicted" when determining who is a victim and the amount of
restitution to be paid.
2. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Determining
Restitution
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has spent some time
examining issues created by plea bargains and restitution. One such examination
of restitution begins in State v. Whetzel.144 In Whetzel, the defendant was indicted
on six counts, including accessory after the fact to second-degree arson. 145 Plea
negotiations took place, and as a result of entering into a plea bargain, the
defendant agreed to plead guilty to three charges. 146 The plea agreement,
however, "provided that sentencing would be left to the discretion of the circuit
court."1 47 It was further agreed within the plea bargain that the defendant would
"pay restitution. . . in the amount of $846.39."l48
Before the defendant's sentencing hearing, the victims of the crimes had
filed victim impact statements. 149 One statement claimed that the victim had
suffered a loss of $30,000 as a result of the arson. 10 Subsequently, the lower
court ordered the defendant to pay the additional restitution amount." On
appeal, the sole issue was "whether [the defendant] can legally be required to
pay $30,000.00 restitution to [the victim] for the burning of [the victim's]
barn."1

52

The defendant argued on appeal that the plea agreement had already been
entered, and thus "the circuit court erred in ordering restitution because the
restitution requirement did not comport with the terms of his plea agreement." 1 3

Id. (emphasis added).
488 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1997).
145
Id. at 45.
146
Id. "[T]he appellant agreed to plead guilty to being an accessory after the fact to
second
degree arson . .
and also agreed to plead guilty to the two counts charging him with
conspiracy ..... Id. at 46.
143

144

147

Id.

I48

Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
11 Id. at 47.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 48. The plea agreement only required the defendant to pay $846.39, and thus
the
defendant argued that the lower court erred in ordering restitution beyond the agreed amount in the
plea bargain. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia pointed out that the plea
agreement was not binding because it had explicitly agreed to leave sentencing
to the circuit court.154 The court further concluded that the additional restitution
outside of the plea agreement was permissible because "the charges of being an
accessory are not independent, but to a certain extent, are entwined with, and
partake of, the principal offense.""'
In State v. Cummings,'56 the defendant was an office manager at a
medical office.157 The defendant had embezzled from the medical business "by
stealing cash, forging checks, improperly using the company credit card,
retaining the proceeds from the sale of a storage building, and granting himself
an unauthorized raise.""' After confessing to the conduct, the defendant was
59
indicted for a multiple counts of criminal conduct. The defendant entered into
a plea agreement upon which he pleaded "no contest" to "one count of
60
embezzlement, one count of forgery, and one count of uttering."' Also within
the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to "make restitution in the amount to
6
be determined at a Restitution Hearing."'
At the restitution hearing, the lower court determined that the total
amount of restitution of $48,778.98 should be paid to the victim.162 A total of
$12,000 of the $48,778.98 was based on income the victim lost as a result of
court appearances.' 63 The court noted that absent a "statutory scheme" allowing
for such restitution, "courts have not been inclined to expand the scope of
statutorily-defined restitution." 6 4 The court further noted that other jurisdictions
have adopted rules stating that "a defendant may be ordered to pay restitution
only for an offense that he has admitted, upon which he has been found guilty,
65
or upon which he has agreed to pay restitution."' Interestingly, though, the
court stated the following in a footnote:
We tangentially note that situations may arise in which, through
the process of plea bargaining, a defendant and the State might
propose a plea bargain which includes restitution for offenses
contained in the indictment to which the defendant had not pled
guilty. In such instance, the inclusion of such other items of

156

Id. at 49.
Id. at 48.
589 S.E.2d 48 (W. Va. 2003) (per curiam).

157

Id. at 50.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

162

Id.
Id.
Id.

163

Id.

'

Id. at 53.

165

Id. at 52 (emphasis added).

154
155

161
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restitution would rest within the sound discretion of the lower
court in its consideration of the plea bargain agreement.166
But the court concluded that the value of lost wages should be excluded
from the restitution order "because the West Virginia statute governing this
matter does not include restitution for loss of wages incurred by the victim while
attending court proceedings."1 6 7
Yet another case addressing restitution is State v. Atwell. 16 8 In Atwell,
the defendant was charged with burglary and larceny after taking a refrigerator
and a stove from the victim's home. 169 The defendant pleaded guilty to both
counts and was sentenced to 1 to 15 years for the burglary charge and 1 to 10
years for the larceny charge. 170 Despite the defendant's admission to taking only
a refrigerator and a stove, the trial court ordered the full amount of restitution,
which included other items purportedly stolen." On appeal, the State argued
that "as part of the [defendant's] guilty plea, he agreed to pay the amount
recommended by the Adult Probation Department, which ... amounts to
$50,013.00."1172 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West' Virginia ultimately
reversed and remanded for further determination on the amount because the trial
court had failed to consider "all of the pertinent circumstances in determining the
practicality of an award of full restitution." 173 However, several justices
disagreed, hinging their reasoning upon the plea agreement.
Justice Menis Ketchum, in his dissent, agreed with the State's logic that
"[t]he agreement provided that the defendant agreed to pay the amount of
restitution recommended by the Adult Probation Department" and stated that the
trial court correctly ordered the amount recommended. 174 Still, Justice Allen
Loughry, who concurred in part and dissented in part, pointed out that the "plea
agreement provides that [the defendant] will pay restitution 'in an amount to be
determined by the Adult Probation Department."'1 75 However, Justice Loughry
reasoned that "[1]ogic dictates . .. that the defendant believed that he was
agreeing to Adult Probation determining the value of the stove and the
refrigerator-the only items to which [the defendant] had agreed to plead guilty
to stealing." 7 6 As such, Justice Loughry concluded that because the plea
agreement did not list any additional items that were lost, the costs should be
166

Id. at 53 n.4.

167

Id. at 53.
765 S.E.2d 182 (W. Va. 2014).
Id. at 183.

168
169

170

Id.

172

Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
Id.
State v. Atwell, 765 S.E.2d 182, 185 (W. Va. 2014) (Ketchum, J., dissenting).
Id. at 186 (Loughry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

172
173
174

175
176

Id.
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limited to the 'loss sustained by [the] victim as a result of the offense' for which
the defendant was charged and convicted: grand larceny for the theft of a
stainless steel stove and refrigerator."177
3. Plea Agreements and Contracts in West Virginia
Among West Virginia case law discussing the interplay between
restitution and plea agreements, there are cases that explore the binding power
of plea agreements as enforceable contracts. This Section highlights the
importance of the interaction between plea agreements and restitution within
West Virginia. This interaction helps in setting the foundation in exposing
judicial overstepping when West Virginia courts order restitution pursuant to
parties agreeing to pay additional amounts outside the offense for which the
defendant was convicted.
In Brewer v. Starcher,17 8 the defendant entered into a plea agreement
with the state that stated, inter alia, that the defendant would possibly pay a fine
and restitution for all of the victim's medical expenses.1 79 Subsequently, at a later
hearing, the state prepared a sentencing order at the court's request, which
mirrored the oral order given during the hearing.s0 However, the judge rejected
the proposed order and sent another written order that ultimately modified the
prior agreement.'"' The second modified order "kept the earlier terms of the plea
agreement, but ordered the [defendant] to pay $5,000 for the pain and suffering
of the victim in addition to the $2,500 fine ... and the restitution for the medical
expenses[.]"l8 2 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ultimately
concluded that "when a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the
prosecution, the circuit court must ensure the defendant receives what is
reasonably due to him under the agreement"' 8 3 and that a circuit court may not
"unilaterally modify" 18 4 a plea agreement that has been accepted by the
defendant, prosecution, and court.I"
The court went on to say that "when a plea rests in any significant degree
on a promise or agreement .. . so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."' 86 The court reasoned that plea
agreements require defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights, and

177

Id. at 187.

178

465 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va. 1995).

179

Id. at 190.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id. at 192.

184

Id. at 193.

I85

Id.

186

Id. at 192 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
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subsequently, courts and prosecutors are to be held to a higher, more
"meticulous" standard in ensuring that the defendant receives both the promise
and performance for which he bargained by giving up the considerable rights
preserved by the Constitution.1 7
In Thompson v. Pomponio," the defendant was indicted with
conspiracy to commit a felony (Count I) and delivery of a controlled substance
(Count III). 189 At the time of the indictment, the defendant was "at large" for
some time before he was apprehended and charged with a breaking and entering
charge along with a grand larceny charge.190 The defendant entered into a plea
agreement in which he pleaded guilty to Count I for the dismissal of Count III
and the pending breaking and entering charge. 191 The circuit court accepted the
defendant's plea to the first count and stated that it would dismiss the pending
breaking and entering charge against the defendant. 192
After the case was closed, a new prosecutor reviewed the file and noticed
that the plea agreement "did not identify the breaking and entering charge by
case number, did not mention the grand larceny charge, and did not specify
whether the dismissal of charges was with prejudice." 93 Thus, the new
prosecutor presented the charges to a grand jury who then returned an indictment
for breaking and entering and grand larceny. 194
The defendant sought two things: (1) to quash the indictment and (2) a
motion for specific performance of the plea agreement that was previously
entered.195 However, the circuit court denied the defendant's motion because
there was no mention of "with prejudice" in the plea agreement.196 Thus, because
there was no mention of "with prejudice" in the plea agreement, the charge could
be pursued once more. The defendant then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent
187
Id. at 193 (holding that "[b]ecause a plea agreement requires a defendant to waive
fundamental rights, we are compelled to hold prosecutors and courts to the most meticulous
standards of both promise and performance"); see also Lombrano v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 15
(Ariz. 1980) (in banc) (finding that because the acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea places
him or her in jeopardy, a trial court could not sua sponte set aside the plea); People v. Matthews,
419 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding that "in the absence of fraud the court had
no power to set aside the plea agreement without the defendant's consent"); People v. Damsky,
366 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court is without
power to withdraw a defendant's plea of guilt).
188
757 S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 2014).
189
Id. at 639.
190
Id. at 638-39.
191
Id. at 639 (accepting defendant's guilty plea of conspiracy to commit a felony and
dismissing Count III of delivery of a controlled substance and the pending breaking and entering
charge but failing to make any mention of the pending grand larceny charge).
192
Id.

193

Id.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 640.
Id.

196
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the prosecution of the charges and to "procure his immediate discharge from
custody."

97

In reviewing the defendant's request, the court began by pointing out
that the "contract" right that he sought to exercise is one rooted in the
Constitution and that a "broken government promise that induced [a] guilty plea
implicates [the] due process clause because it impairs voluntariness and
intelligence of plea[s]."1 98 Subsequently, the court turned to federal case law, and
ultimately agreed with the reasoning that the government bears "a greater degree
of responsibility than the defendant . .. for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements."l 99 Thus, the court concluded that "the state bears the primary
responsibility for insuring precision and unambiguity in a plea agreement
because of the significant constitutional rights the defendant waives by entering
a guilty plea. If a plea agreement is imprecise or ambiguous, such imprecision or
ambiguity will be construed in favor of the defendant."200
III. ANALYSIS
There are three issues that arise with West Virginia's restitution law.
First, it has a broader scope of application than the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act, and thus, West Virginia's statute has the pitfall of requiring
defendants to pay restitution well exceeding the monetary loss incurred by the
victim. Second, it lacks an explicit definition of "victim," which creates a limited
application. Third, and most alarmingly, West Virginia courts are exceeding their
statutory authority in ordering restitution pursuant to a plea agreement when the
agreement assigns the defendant restitution for offenses contained in the
indictment to which the defendant had not pleaded guilty. To remedy these
issues, the West Virginia Legislature must either enact a new law or modify the
current law so as to allow for courts to exercise efficient and proper authority
when ordering restitution.
Section III.A explores the scope of both the MVRA and section 61-11 A4 of the West Virginia Code and determines the application of the statutes on
prior case law through each statutory lens. Section III.B advocates that, despite
the absence of an explicit definition of a restitution eligible victim in section 6111A-4, there is an extrapolated definition, and this definition has its pitfalls when
juxtaposed against the MVRA. Lastly, Section III.C argues that courts are going
beyond their statutory authority in instances where lower courts are following
the suggestion made in Cummings by allowing parties to agree to restitution

Id.
Id. at 642 (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984)).
199
Id. (citing United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986)).
200
State ex rel. Thompson v. Pomponio, 757 S.E.2d 636, 643-45 (W. Va. 2014) (concluding
that "the circuit court exceeded its legitimate authority in allowing the instant prosecution to
proceed through its denial of the [defendant's] motion to quash and seeking specific performance
of the subject plea agreement, as reflected in its order entered on August 5, 2013").
197
198
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beyond the victim of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. The
Legislature must either enact a new law or modify the current law so as to allow
for courts to exercise efficient and proper authority when ordering restitution to
remedy these issues that arise out of the state's restitution law. The modification
of West Virginia's law on restitution may involve mirroring the MVRA.
A.

The Statutory Scope of the MVRA and West Virginia Code § 61-11A-4

It seems to be well settled that federal courts do not have the inherent
power to order restitution absent statutory authority.201 The scope of the MVRA
is limited in that only particular conduct and crimes permit courts to order
restitution to victims of those crimes.202 Thus, for a court to order that restitution
be paid by a convicted defendant, not only must a court have authority by statute,
but the crime must also be one enumerated within the statute.203 Snider illustrates
the limitations and scope of federal restitution by recognizing that where the
crime of structuring finances to evade reporting requirements is not enumerated
or not within the scope, courts lack the authority to order restitution.204
On the other hand, although no explicit case addresses the issue of
whether West Virginia courts have the authority to order restitution absent
statutory authority, the holdings in Starcher and Cummings suggest that the
authority to order restitution is entirely derived by statute and that, as is the case
in federal case law, there is no inherent authority of the courts to deviate or
expand beyond this statutory grant of authority.205 Thus, there is no reason to
think that restitution in West Virginia is exempt from requiring statutory
authority. On the contrary, the precedent suggests the need for the Legislature to
give courts the ability to order restitution.
Furthermore, unlike the MVRA, the West Virginia statute does not have
a scope limited by enumerated conduct. Consequently, the West Virginia statute
reaches broadly so as to include any crime where a physical, psychological, or
economic injury occurs as a result of the offense. Thus, even though case law
suggests that West Virginia courts must still have statutory authority to order

201
See United States v. Snider, 957 F.2d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Barany, 884
F.2d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[Tjhe court's discretion in ordering restitution is not
unlimited."); United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d. 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
because neither statute applied, the district court lacked the power to require restitution); United
States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the district court lacked the
statutory authority to order restitution).
202
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A) (2012).
203
Id. § 3663A.
204
Snider, 957 F.2d at 703.
205
See State v. Cummings, 589 S.E.2d 48, 50 (W. Va. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that ordering
restitution to a victim for losses incurred by attending court proceedings was not within the
statutory authority granted by the legislature); State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher, 465 S.E.2d 185,
194 (W. Va. 1995).
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restitution, because the West Virginia statute is inclusive of most crimes, there
is hardly an instance where a court lacks the authority to grant restitution.
For instance, consider the case of Snider, where the victim suffered a
loss of $18,750, but the defendant entered a plea agreement which included a
provision that the defendant would pay restitution in the amount of $183,000.206
If the facts in Sniderwere in a case before a West Virginia court, the result would
be contrary to the federal holding due to the broad scope of authority provided
by the Legislature. Under West Virginia's statute, the defendant in Snider would
be responsible for the restitution ordered by the lower court because of the overly
sweeping coverage of the state's statute. Thus, under West Virginia's statute, the
defendant in Snider would be responsible for paying upwards of $183,000 in
restitution to the government despite the victim suffering a total loss of
$18,750.207 Although the greater amount was derived and agreed to by the parties
in the form of a plea bargain, the court in Snider nevertheless recognized that the
initial order of restitution was not viable since the restitution statute employed
was not applicable in Snider.2 08
It is clear that the scope of the West Virginia statute is much broader
than the MVRA because it is not limited to particular conduct and crimes but
instead includes any crime where physical, psychological, or economic injury
occurs. Nevertheless, while prosecutors likely celebrate the breadth of the
statute, and defense lawyers cringe at what seems an uphill battle, the statute's
broad sweep and lack of definition still leave a glaring hole in determining when
restitution is appropriate.2 09 The real damage from West Virginia's wide
sweeping statute and precedent2 10 is apparent when defendants who are in
scenarios similar to that described in Snider are ordered to pay restitution far
exceeding the monetary loss the victim incurred.
Furthermore, this damaging and wide-sweeping effect of the statute
contradicts the West Virginia policy as set forth in the legislative purpose.211
That is, the application of West Virginia's statute to cases similar to Snider does
not align with the legislative purposes of the law, which are "to enhance and
protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice
system." 2 12 West Virginia's legislature has observed, through the enactment of
its statute, that the primary purpose of restitution falls on the premise that there
is an interest in protecting and assisting the victims of crime. 213 By allowing
instances where victims recover substantially more than the loss incurred by the

206

Snider, 957 F.2d at 706.

207

Id.

208

Id.
See infra Section III.B.
See supra Section II.D.3.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-1 1A-1(b) (LexisNexis 2017).

209
210
211

212
213

Id.
Id.
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crime, the purpose of restitution deviates from the clear articulation by the West
Virginia Legislature and becomes punitive in nature and perhaps more similar to
a potential award in a civil suit. 214 Thus, although differences are far and wide in
restitution laws across the country, West Virginia's current codification allows
too wide of a sweep that permits instances contrary to the West Virginia
legislative findings and recovery of injuries well beyond the injuries the victim
actually incurred. Therefore, to close the range of West Virginia's restitution
statute, the law should not only either enact a new law or modify the current law,
but the new law or modified law should also mirror the scope of the MVRA so
as to prevent unprecedented scenarios as described above.
B. Who Is a "Victim" Within the Statutory Scheme?
Recovery under the MVRA is limited to a victim's losses that are
(1) directly caused by the offense of conviction, (2) caused by all of the acts
included within the scope of the scheme or conspiracy, if a "scheme, conspiracy
or pattern of criminal activity" is an element of the offense, or (3) amounts
otherwise expressly agreed to in a plea agreement. 2 15 These three means of
recovery come from the language of the MVRA including the definition of a
victim. 2 16 Freeman and Kerrell illustrate who is considered a victim under the
MVRA.2 17 Both Freeman and Kerrell recognize that the "victims," while
undeniably victims of a crime, are not victims for the purposes of restitution
because they are not victims whose losses are directly and proximately caused
by the offense of the conviction.218
Under the MVRA, a victim is also considered as such for the purposes
of restitution when the victim is injured as a result of a crime where a scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern is an element of the crime.219
Consider the following: assume that an individual conspires with another
to defraud two insurance agencies by writing and passing fake checks as if issued
by the insurers. Imagine further that the individual is indicted for only one count
of conspiracy to defraud the first insurance agency. Assuming now that the
defendant pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay restitution to both victims, this
would be allowed under the MVRA because the crime in which the conviction

214
See supra Section H.A. 1 (discussing the purpose and policy behind restitution within
different jurisdictions).
215
See supra Section II.C.1.
216

Id.

See supra Section II.C.2.
218
See United States v. Freeman, 741 F.3d 426,430 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the offense of
obstructing justice by failing to report financial earnings is not a crime of conviction for which the
victims of fraud are able to recover restitution); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th
Cir. 1950) (finding that victims of dismissed counts were not victims who suffered losses arising
out of the offense of the conviction and were therefore not able to recovery restitution).
219
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (2012).
217
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occurs is one in which the conspiracy is the element of the crime. More
specifically, under the MVRA, the second insurer may be able to recover
restitution-despite the count missing from the indictment-because the victim
may have suffered a loss as a result of the offense for which the defendant is
convicted, and conspiracy was an element of that conviction. Therefore, the
MVRA, although limited in other ways,220 is broader than the West Virginia
statute in its definition of who is an eligible victim for purposes of restitution.
Unlike the MVRA, the West Virginia statute does not provide an explicit
definition of a victim eligible for restitution. 221 The statute provides that "the
court .. . shall order . . that the defendant make restitution to any victim of the
offense." 2 22 The statute further states that the order is only available "when
sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor causing physical,
psychological, or economic injury . . . ."223 Thus, while the statute does not
contain an explicit definition of an eligible victim, one can be extrapolated.
Under this extrapolated definition, a victim is a person who has suffered a
physical, psychological, or economic injury from the offense of which the
defendant has been convicted.
This two-part definition requires (1) that the victim suffer either a
physical, psychological, or economic loss, and (2) that the loss arise out of the
offense in which the defendant was convicted. Turning now to the conspiracy
example recounted above, under section 61-11 A-4 of the West Virginia Code,
the victim of the count never indicted clearly meets the first prong of the
definition in that he or she has suffered one of the three proscribed injuries.
However, the victim of the second count falls short of being able to recover
restitution because of the second prong.
The victim of the second count that was never indicted does not have a
loss arising out of the offense of the defendant's conviction because the
conviction pertains to conspiracy to defraud the first insurance agency. Thus,
section 61-11 A-4, unlike the MVRA, does not allow for restitution where the
offense of the conviction contains an element of conspiracy. While one may
suggest that a defendant should not be ordered to pay restitution for a crime of
which he or she was not convicted because the language of the statute is clear,
this creates a problem in the context of criminal conspiracy for the tribunal,
prosecution, victim(s), and defendant. For example, under West Virginia law, the
prosecution would have to list each conspiracy charge in the plea agreement, the
defendant is less likely to take a plea deal which includes multiple counts of
conspiracy, and consequently, the court could have to hear a case containing
multiple conspiracy charges (potentially taking a substantial amount of time). In
order to sidestep the drawbacks listed above, the prosecution is enticed into
dismissing some counts of conspiracy to encourage the defendant to enter into a
220
221
222
223

See supra Section III.A.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11A-4 (LexisNexis 2017).

Id.
Id.
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plea. However, such prosecutorial conduct includes complete disregard for the
victim(s). Overlooking victims is undoubtedly contrary to the purpose of
restitution.22 4 Thus, while the argument that the defendant should not pay
restitution for crimes of which he is not convicted seems sensible, abiding by
such a plain reading of the statute in terms of criminal conspiracy charges entirely
forgoes the purpose of protecting and assisting victims of crime.
Nevertheless, because of West Virginia's limited definition of an eligible
victim, prosecutors must precisely determine who is a victim, specifically in
crimes of conspiracy, in order to further the Legislative purpose of West
Virginia's restitution law. 225 Alternatively, to correct this deficiency in the
statute, the Legislature should take action to broaden the scope and definition of
a restitution eligible victim.
C. How FarCan Plea BargainingGo?

Consider the scenario where an accountant works for two separate
business offices: offices X and Y. During the accountant's employment, he
begins to embezzle from both X and Y by removing small denominations from
the weekly deposits. Subsequently, the accountant's conduct is discovered and
he is indicted on two counts of embezzlement: Count I pertaining to office X and
Count II pertaining to office Y. After some time, the prosecution and the
accountant (defendant) reach an agreement that Count II will be dismissed for
the defendant's guilty plea to Count I. Suppose further that there is a clause
stating that the defendant agrees to pay restitution to the victim, in an amount to
be determined by adult probation. The court accepts the plea and enters the order.
Do both victims recover restitution despite Count II being dismissed?
Here, because embezzlement falls within the realm of the MVRA's
enumerated conduct of theft, there is no dispute that the crime is within the scope
of the MVRA. Furthermore, as was previously mentioned, recovery under the
MVRA includes amounts agreed to in a plea agreement.226 Congress has
expressly given federal courts authority to order restitution agreed to in a plea
agreement, and thus a federal court does not overstep when doing so. 227
Therefore, under the MVRA, the plea agreement would be enforced, and because
office Y, the victim of Count II, was not a victim of the offense of conviction
224
225

See supra Section II.A. 1.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-1 1A-i(b) (LexisNexis 2017).

[T]he purposes of [the restitution law] are to enhance and protect the necessary
role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process and to ensure
that the state and local governments do all that is possible within the limits of
available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing
on the constitutional rights of the defendant.
Id.
See supra Section II.C. 1.
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(3) (2012) ("The court shall also order, if agreed to by the parties
in a
plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.").
226
227
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(Count I) office Y will not be able to recover under the MVRA. This reasoning
of
parallels the reasoning in Freeman where the court did not allow recovery
2 28
conviction.
of
crime
the
of
victim
restitution to victims who were not the
The analysis of the above example would likely have the same result
under West Virginia's restitution law because the language of section 61-11 A-4
229
requires that the restitution be paid to the "victim of the offense." Even though
the prosecution may contend that the plea agreement was meant to include both
victims originally named in the indictment, the holding in Starcherlends to the
argument that the deficiency in the drafting of the plea agreement should be
interpreted in favor of the defendant. Thus, if the phrase "the victim" was a
typographical error, and the prosecution instead meant "the victims," the
agreement should still be interpreted so as to only apply to the one victim because
the defendant is waiving a right. 230 The Due Process Clause is implicated because
entering into the agreement where the prosecution drafts the agreement and
231
breaks its promise "impairs voluntariness and intelligence of plea[s]." Just like
in Thompson, where the court concluded that the government bears "a greater
degree of responsibility than the defendant . .. for imprecisions or ambiguities
in plea agreements," 23 2 here, too, it will be recognized that the drafting error
implicates the voluntariness and intelligence of the defendant entering a plea. For
instance, the defendant in the hypothetical may not be as likely to enter into the
agreement having the knowledge that he is agreeing to make restitution to office
Y.
Furthermore, a West Virginia court's acceptance or rejection of a plea
agreement plays an important role233 because the entering of the plea agreement
by the parties and the acceptance of it by the judge make it so that the plea
agreement cannot be revoked.234 Still, because the defendant is offering his
228

United States v. Freeman, 741 F.3d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that the crime of

obstructing justices by making false statements in an affidavit before the bankruptcy court does
not warrant restitution to the victims of the defendant's fraud when the defendant is not on trial for
fraud).
229
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11 A-4 (LexisNexis 2017).
230

State ex rel. Brewer v. Starcher, 465 S.E.2d 185, 192 (W. Va. 1995). This prospective

argument should fail on other grounds pertaining to West Virginia courts lacking the statutory
power otherwise. However, the Author included the argument here as a means of illustrating
deference in favor of the defendant when interpreting ambiguities or drafting errors in a plea
agreement.
231
232

State ex rel. Thompson v. Pomponio, 757 S.E.2d 636, 642 (W. Va. 2014) (citation omitted).
Id. (citing United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986)).

Starcher, 465 S.E.2d at 194.
Plea bargaining is "an essential component of the administration of justice"
and the requirement of Rule 11 that a circuit court make a definite
announcement of acceptance, rejection, or deferral of its decision concerning
the plea agreement is indispensable to a criminal justice system so heavily
dependent on the plea agreement processes.
Id. (citation omitted).
233

234

Id. at 193.
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constitutional right as consideration for the bargaining of leniency, West Virginia
courts have shifted the drafting responsibilities onto the state.235
While the above hypothetical is in line with West Virginia precedent,
consider the same example above, but this time, the agreement states that the
defendant is to pay restitution to both the victims, despite Count II of the
indictment being dismissed. It is under this second embezzlement example that
the West Virginia statute and supporting precedent exceed the statutory
authority.
In Cummings, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that
there are instances in which a defendant can agree to pay more in restitution to a
victim other than the victim of the offense when the count pertaining to the victim
was dismissed but originally included in the indictment.236 Furthermore, the
Justices who dissented in Atwell relied on the reasoning in Cummings to disagree
with the outcome of reversing the defendant's restitution order.237 Justice
Ketchum reasoned that the defendant agreed to pay an amount to be determined
by the adult probation and that this agreement is permissible and should be
enforced pursuant to Cummings.238 Justice Loughry agreed in part with Justice
Ketchum but relied more on the subjective belief of the defendant when he
entered into the agreement with the state. 239

[W]e believe that a circuit court's unilateral modification of a specific
judicially accepted plea agreement presents a clear violation of [criminal
procedure] Rule 11 .

..

. Once a circuit court unconditionally accepts on the

record a [plea] agreement, the circuit court is without authority to vacate the
plea and order reinstatement of the original charge. Furthermore, after a
defendant is sentenced on the record in open court, unilateral modification of
the sentencing decision by the circuit court is not an option contemplated
within the rule.
Id. at 192-93.
235
See id.; Pomponio, 757 S.E.2d at 642.
236
State v. Cummings, 589 S.E.2d 48, 53 n.4 (W. Va. 2003) (per curiam).
237
State v. Atwell, 765 S.E.2d 182, 185-86 (W. Va. 2014) (Ketchum,
J., dissenting) (Loughry,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238
Id. at 187 (Ketchum, J., dissenting).
To be clear, I firmly believe that a criminal defendant should be required to
pay restitution in an amount that fully compensates his or her victim for the
loss sustained as a result of the offense. If the State believed that other items
should have been included in the grand larceny charge, the State could have
included those other items. For whatever reason or purpose, it did not.
Consequently, on remand, I believe the trial court should determine the
appropriate amount of restitution based on the "loss sustained by [the] victim
as a result of the offense" for which the defendant was charged and convicted:
grand larceny for the theft of a stainless steel stove and refrigerator.
Id. (citation omitted).
239
Id. at 186 (Loughry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Logic dictates ..
. that
the defendant believed that he was agreeing to Adult Probation determining the value of the stove
and the refrigerator-the only items to which [the defendant] had agreed to plead guilty to
stealing." Id.
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While the "tangential" 240 suggestion made in Cummings would be
permissible under the MVRA because the statute allows for ordering restitution
agreed to in a plea agreement regardless of whether the restitution goes beyond
the victim of the offense, the West Virginia statute is absent any such grant of
authority. 241 Thus, the dissenting Justices in Atwell, although justified in relying
on staredecisis, are suggesting an exercise of authority that West Virginia's law
242
does not authorize. Despite the broad scope of the statute, courts within West
Virginia are limited to ordering restitution in instances where the "victim" is the
victim of the offense of the conviction, regardless of whether the parties agree
otherwise. 243 This does not mean that the court cannot order restitution agreed to
in a plea agreement. It does mean, however, that the agreement of restitution
cannot be ordered when it includes restitution to victims other than those for the
offense of the conviction. In other words, if West Virginia courts adopt and apply
the reasoning in Cummings as a means of justifying an order of restitution that
goes beyond the offense of the conviction, those courts would be overstepping
2
by exercising authority not available under the statute. " Therefore, if courts are
to order restitution in such circumstances, a change to the current law giving
courts additional authority is required.
IV. CONCLUSION
On June 25, 2012, Roof would lose his life in a fatal car accident and
Meyn would be sentenced to prison and ultimately ordered to pay $1 million
dollars in restitution.2 4 5 Roof's wife would endure a nearly five-year battle to
24 6
Just as the change in Arizona
obtain the restitution order against Meyn.
required the legislature to act before the courts would allow victims to make an
argument before the court, West Virginia's statute must also be amended and
changed in order to provide clarity and allow courts to make an order of
restitution in instances not currently permitted under the statute. This change may
include mirroring the MVRA.

240

Cummings, 589 S.E.2d at 53 n.4.
We tangentially note that situations may arise in which, through the process of
plea bargaining, a defendant and the State might propose a plea bargain which
includes restitution for offenses contained in the indictment to which the
defendant had not pled guilty. In such instance, the inclusion of such other
items of restitution would rest within the sound discretion of the lower court
in its consideration of the plea bargain agreement.

Id.
241

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 61-11 A-4 (LexisNexis

2017).

See supra Section III.A.
243
See supra Section III.B (discussing the eligibility for restitution for victims under section
61-11 A-4 of the West Virginia Code).
244
§ 61-11A-4.
245
Kiefer, supra note 1.
242

246

Id.
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Thus, this Note answers the two questions set out earlier. First, where
does the source of the authority to order a defendant to make restitution
originate? Second, does the authority to order restitution inherently flow from
the court's punitive function in pursuing justice in criminal cases, or does it come
from somewhere else?
The ability to order restitution is undeniably derived from statute. Given
the examples illustrated above2 47 and the exploration of West Virginia and
federal precedent, West Virginia requires statutory authority to order restitution.
Additionally, restitution plays more of a rehabilitative and restorative role than a
punitive one. The West Virginia statute, despite its breadth, is narrow in its
definition of a victim and, as such, may exclude victims from recovery.
Furthermore, West Virginia courts would be going beyond the permissible
statutory authority they rely on the suggestion in Cummings as justification for
ordering restitution to victims of a dismissed count originally in the indictment.
To remedy the unauthorized exercise ofjudicial power and lack of definition, the
West Virginia Legislature must either enact a new law or modify the current law
to allow for courts to exercise the authority that Cummings suggests. Without
amending the current law, courts should otherwise refrain from ordering
restitution in instances in which the note in Cummings suggests.
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